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Summary findings
Payments problems constrained interstate trade among  and Turkmenistan must develop transparent  means of
the CIS countries in 1992-95,  especially during the  trade financing that take into account the recipient
prolonged demise of the ruble zone. Two kinds of  countries' ability to pay.
solution should be sought: more effective stabilization  External financing will remain important  for
measures to improve the prospects of currency  practically all CIS countries. The best way to mobilize
convertibility among CIS countries, and strengthening of  private financing will be to establish macroeconomic
institutional arrangements to permit payments and  stability and stable, transparent rules on private capital
settlements through correspondent  bank accounts.  inflows. Improving the flow of public resources requires
Strengthening institutions will require not only  improving countries' capacity to quickly absorb the large
strengthening commercial banks but liberalizing foreign  amounts already committed. Donors need to expedite
exchange markets and promoting the use of letters of  procurement and other procedures and recipient
credit and other mechanisms to increase the security of  countries must address governance problems and
trade transactions.  institutional weaknesses that delay disbursements.
A multilateral clearing arrangement operated among  Certain smaller CIS countries face significant debt
central banks would have been a useful alternative to the  servicing problems and often the creditors are other CIS
chaotic payments prevailing earlier, but such  countries that themselves need additional financing. The
arrangements are no longer needed as considerable  smaller countries need debt relief on concessional terms,
progress has been made toward convertibility. Nor is a  possible only if external assistance allows local creditors
payments union desirable.  to offer such relief.
Trade deficits are likely to persist in such countries as
Belarus and Ukraine. Surplus countries such as Russia
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This paper was prepared as part of an ongoing research on trade and payments issues in the
former Soviet Union.  The paper will appear as part of afestschrift to Peter Kenen.  It is
based in part on work that I have undertaken  in collaboration  with David Tarr to whom  I am
also grateful for comments  on the present draftPAYMENTS AND FINANCE PROBLEMS IN THE CIS
A.  INTRODUCTION
Integration of the previously centrally  planned countries  into the
international  economy  has presented  some of the most difficult challenges  of
transition  to the market.  State control of trade and foreign exchange, vastly
distorted  prices and insufficiently  developed  financial  institutions  left countries
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ill prepared to participate  and
benefit from international  trade and finance.  At the same time their
governments  realized that without integration  into the international  economy,
the transition  to a market system would  never be complete  or successful.
In 1990, Peter Kenen prepared  a report for the IMF which focused  on
the implications  of price liberalization  and moving to international  prices and
convertible  currencies  for trade and financial  relationships  among  the countries
of Eastern Europe which were members  of the soon to be defunct CMEA
[Kenen, 19911. He concluded  that the needed  economic  reforms will worsen
these countries' terms of trade and drive them into a current account  deficit
with the USSR. He recommended  the extension  of medium-term  financing
from the USSR to individual  countries and additional  external financing  from
the international  community  to cope with the terms of trade shock.'
In 1992, the USSR itself collapsed  and in its place fifteen new countries
emerged, all proceeding  with price liberalization  and moving  to international
prices and convertibility  at a different pace.  The problems of economic
relations  between Eastern Europe and the USSR were quickly overshadowed2
by the problems of the countries in the former Soviet Union itself:  Inadequate
payments arrangements and a poorly functioning banking system constrained
trade and payments with the rest of the world but especially with each other.
Price liberalization resulted in a severe terms of trade shock for energy
importers within the former USSR such as the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus,
and contributed to the emergence of large intra-FSU balance of payments
disequilibria.  With the exception of the Baltics, monetary instability combined
with institutional weaknesses have impeded countries'  efforts to cope with
these financing difficulties.
Since then, Eastern Europe has dealt remarkably well with international
trade problems arising in the context of transition: There were few financing
difficulties with the USSR in part because of supply declines in Russian and
other FSU exportables, and in part because of a rapid reorientation of Eastern
Europe's  trade to the OECD.  Additional international financing, as suggested
by Kenen, also became available to most countries [Bosworth and Ofer,  1995].
The situation in many of the FSU countries, however,  continues to be a
source of concern:  Four years after independence, some progress in
strengthening financial institutions has been achieved.  Stabilization has been
attained in several countries and significant efforts are underway in others.
Yet, trade among these countries is but a fraction of previous levels and a
substantial share of it is conducted under barter arrangements.  Payments
problems appear to still plague trade in many countries with the exception of
the Baltics; and no solution is in sight for the financing problems large3
imbalances  in intra-FSU trade have created in countries  like Belarus, Ukraine
or Georgia.
The purpose of this paper is threefold: (a) to analyze the impact  of
payments  problems  on trade among the FSU countries, using a framework
similar to the one Kenen used in the context of the Eastern European
countries; (b) to review  and analyze  alternative solutions  to these problems;
and (c) recommend  appropriate  institutional  and policy reforms, including
ways to deal with the intractable  intra-FSU financing  difficulties. The focus is
on the members of the Commonwealth  of Independent  States (CIS), i.e.,  all
FSU countries  except the Baltics. The reason is that the Baltics, soon after the
dissolution  of the Soviet Union, took steps to introduce  convertible  currencies
and thus avoided the bulk of the payments problems  discussed here.  The
following section reviews  trends in trade and in the evolution of payments
mechanisms.  Section C discusses  the issue of financial  imbalances. Section
D discusses  proposals for institutional  reform including the establishment  of
multilateral  clearing and payments  arrangements. The final section contains
conclusions  and recommendations.
B.  TRENDS  IN TRADE AND PAYMENTS
1.  The trade decline
In the aftermath  of independence,  trade of the new independent  states
of the FSU with the rest of the world declined but trade with each other
apparently collapsed. Official estimates  using market exchange rates show a4
decline in exports to the rest of the world of 14% between 1991 and 1994; and
a drop of 87% in exports to other FSU countries (Table 1).  Russia  is by far
the largest trading country in absolute terms with its trade accounting  for over
50% of the total, with Ukraine at 19% a distant second. There are many
problems  with these estimates: First, they clearly overstate the actual decline
in 1992 because  the exchange rate used to convert rubles to dollars in 1991
was substantially  overvalued. On the other hand, in subsequent  years the ruble
and some of the other new currencies  were substantially  undervalued  using
purchasing  power parity and wages-in-dollars  comparisons  [Michalopoulos  and
Tarr 1994a]. Second,  there is evidence  that the actual exchange  rates used in
the conduct of intra-FSU trade in the period 1992-1994  involved  a much
smaller ruble devaluation  vis-a-vis  the dollar.  Third, throughout  the period
there were significant  amounts of trade conducted  through barter.  While the
statistical  agencies  tried to adjust for it, it is doubtful that the adjustments
made captured all the amounts involved.
Data on intra-FSU  trade (called hereafter "interstate  trade") published
by individual  countries  are incomplete  and contradictory. The constant  price
series presented in Table 2 is based in part on World Bank and IMF estimates.
They show a somewhat  smaller decline  for intra-FSU  trade than the series in
US dollars, which however, remains substantial. In most countries exports fell
by 70% to 90%.  Even Russia  and Turkmenistan,  which suffered the smallest
declines over the proiod, still experienced  drops of 67% and 52%,
respectively. The fact that intra-FSU trade declined substantially  is also
corroborated  by firm level surveys [Bull,1994].TABLE 1.  Foreign Trade  of the New Independent  States of the former  Soviet Union, 1991-94
(millions of current U.  S. dollars at market exchange rates)
1991  1992  1993  1994
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Trade with the rest of the world *
Armenia  70  830  40  95  29  188  42  110
Azerbaijan  487  1,248  754  333  351  241  360  275
Belarus  1,661  1,957  1,061  755  737  777  1,053  690
Estonia  50  204  242  254  461  618  730  1,251
Georgia  30  480  161  269  222  460  86  189
Kazakhstan  1,183  2,546  1,489  961  1,529  1,269  1,327  1,694
Kyrgyzstan  23  785  77  71  112  112  112  88
Latvia  125  478  429  423  460  339  524  581
Lithuania  345  475  557  342  696  486  855  1,063
Moldova  180  656  157  170  174  210  121  134
Russia  53,100  45,100  41,600  37,200  43,900  33,100  46,974  35,100
Tajikistan  424  706  111  132  263  374  319  306
Turkmenistan  146  618  1,145  543  1,156  749  371  298
Ukraine  8,500  11,300  6,000  5,500  6,300  4,700  4,648  4,347
Uzbekistan  1,257  2,048  869  929  1,466  1,280  912  1,106
Former Soviet Union  67,581  69,431  54,691  47,977  57,857  44,903  58,433  47,233
Trade with countries of the former Soviet Union
Armenia  3,823  4,686  243  292  124  159  215  359
Azerbaijan  9,091  7,013  521  434  629  461  398  612
Belarus  23,151  20,375  1,939  2,128  3,092  3,348  2,085  2,990
Estonia  3,836  2,996  147  146  341  326  574  405
Georgia  5,594  4,806  144  224  295  433  156  280
Kazakhstan  14,285  16,949  2,141  2,463  3,126  3,576  1,958  2,476
Kyrgyzstan  5,163  4,293  236  344  282  378  325  402
Latvia  5,920  4,365  451  472  587  649  503  652
Lithuania  9,268  6,251  505  624  929  1,111  1,160  1,276
Moldova  6,190  5,525  244  377  636  743  406  449
Russia  108,571  83,333  12,300  **  6,200  **  15,752  10,546  17,700  15,000
Tajikistan  3,456  4,361  93  172  118  198  170  252
Turkmenistan  6,314  3,684  616  410  1,731  876  1,252  313
Ukraine  49,598  61,217  5,262  6,425  5.669  9,185  5,543  7,593
Uzbekistan  13,761  14,100  628  827  2,085  2,225  1,408  1,086
Former Soviet Union  268,022  243,954  25,470  21,537  35,396  34,211  33,853  34,145
* The rest of the  world refers to countries outside  theformer  Soviet Union.
** These recent estimates differfrom  data in Dikhanov,  1995 *vhich shows exports of 10, 954 mnillion  and imports of 9,246 million. These later estimates
are thought to underestimate itnports and may wvell  be subject to further  revision.
Source.  National official statistics  and lMF.TABLE 2.  Volume of Interstate  Trade,  1991-94
(1991  = 1(X))
1992  1993  1994
xport  iports  Epors  Imports  Expors  Ipors
Bsed  on dam iA  onsta  1990 nbles
Armenui  70.5  35.3  30.2  25.8  19.9  18.2
Azawaijan  50.7  46.6  24.6  23.4  10.8  18.4
Bebaus  77.8  76.1  59.2  61.8  42.0  45.3
Estonia  37.9  38.7  21.5  17.6  13.2  18.8
Georgia  24.3  37.5  22.7  33.0  11.1  13.8
Kazakhatan  95.8  110.1  63.8  72.3  32.4  30.8
Kyrgyztan  45.8  56.1  22.8  31.5  18.5  21.5
Latvia  79.6  80.4  23.5  25.1  17.0  23.1
Liduaima  48.2  71.1  28.9  28.3  14.5  18.5
Moldova  52.1  61.3  45.9  46.9  28.5  27.0
Rusaia  72.2  86.2  46.7  54.2  32.5  44.9
Tau}tan  26.1  32.2  15.1  16.2  16.5  13.4
Turkinenitan  95.5  114.7  54.5  100.0  48.2  23.0
Ukraine  64.8  79.3  39.8  56.5  24.9  26.3
Uzbekistan  45.0  49.4  43.3  43.6  28.9  18.2
Former Soviet Union  67.4  77.4  43.7  52.1  29.0  32.7
Source:  1992-1993: Michalopoulos nd Tarr,  1994a.
1994: World Bank staff eianutes.7
Trade with the rest of world declined  much less, and in some countries
not at all since 1992. In part this was because most countries  pursued a
conscious  policy to shift energy and raw material exports to the OECD in
order to earn hard currency  and avoid payments  problems  associated  with FSU
trade.  In the CIS this shift was virtually always undertaken  within an overall
trade regime that restrained exports which  itself had significant  adverse  effects
on output and welfare [Gros, 1994a].
There is a question as to whether the decline  in interstate  trade should
be of concern. This is an issue because there is strong  evidence that under
central  planning, the FSU countries--then  simply  regions of the Soviet Union--
traded excessively  with each other.  Trade with the "rest of the world", i.e.,
foreign trade of the Soviet Union, was totally controlled. Under central
planning "imports were a necessary  evil--the source of last resort for basic raw
materials and other inputs that could not be produced  at home in quantities
sufficient  to meet domestic needs.  Exports were needed to pay for imports,
but they were released reluctantly,  because of domestic shortages"  [Kenen,
1991, p.246].  Moreover, production was highly concentrated,  with some
goods produced  by a single or very few producers.
Consequently,  trade among  the then Republics  absorbed an unusually
high proportion of total trade. 2 At 61 % of total trade, Russia  had the lowest
dependence  on trade with the other republics in 1991; for the others, such
trade amounted  to between 82 and 93 % of the total (Table 3).TABLE 3.  Distribution  of Interstate  Trade,  1991-94
(percent)
1991  1992  1993  1994
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  imports  Exports  imports
Country  share  of total interstate  trade
Armenia  I.4  1.9  1.0  1.4  0.3  0.5  0.6  1.1
Azerbaijan  3.4  2.9  2.0  2.0  1.8  1.3  1.2  1.8
Belarus  8.6  8.4  7.6  9.9  8.7  9.8  6.2  8.8
Estonia  1.4  1.2  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.0  1.7  1.2
Georgia  2.1  2.0  0.6  1.0  0.8  1.3  0.5  0.8
Kazakhstan  5.3  6.9  8.4  11.4  8.8  10.5  5.8  7.3
Kyrgyzstan  1.9  1.8  0.9  1.6  0.8  1.1  1.0  1.2
Latvia  2.2  1.8  1.8  2.2  1.7  1.9  1.5  1.9
Lithuania  3.5  2.6  2.0  2.9  2.6  3.2  3.4  3.7
Moldova  2.3  2.3  1.0  1.8  1.8  2.2  1.2  1.3
Russia  40.5  34.2  48.3  28.8  44.5  30.8  52.3  43.9
Tajikistan  1.3  1.8  0.4  0.8  0.3  0.6  0.5  0.7
Turkmenistan  2.4  1.5  2.4  1.9  4.9  2.6  3.7  0.9
Ukraine  18.5  25.1  20.7  29.8  16.0  26.8  16.4  22.2
Uzbekistan  5.1  5.8  2.5  3.8  5.9  6.5  4.2  3.2
Former  Soviet Union  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Trade with the rest of the world as a share of total trade
Armenia  1.8  15.0  14.1  24.6  19.2  54.2  16.3  23.5
Azerbaijan  5.1  15.1  59.1  43.4  35.8  34.3  47.5  31.0
Belarus  6.7  8.8  35.4  26.2  19.2  18.8  33.6  18.8
Estonia  1.3  6.4  62.2  63.5  57.5  65.5  56.0  75.5
Georgia  0.5  9.1  52.8  54.5  43.0  51.5  35.4  40.3
Kazakhstan  7.6  13.1  41.0  28.1  32.8  26.2  40.4  40.6
Kyrgyzstan  0.4  15.5  24.5  17.0  28.4  22.9  25.6  18.0
Latvia  2.1  9.9  48.8  47.2  43.9  34.3  51.0  47.1
Lithuania  3.6  7.1  52.5  35.4  42.8  30.4  42.4  45.4
Moldova  2.8  10.6  39.1  31.1  21.5  22.0  22.9  23.0
Russia  32.8  35.1  77.2  85.7  73.6  75.8  72.6  70.1
Tajikistan  10.9  13.9  54.3  43.5  69.0  65.4  65.2  54.9
Turkmenistan  2.3  14.4  65.0  57.0  40.0  46.1  22.8  48.8
Ukraine  14.6  15.6  53.3  46.1  52.6  33.9  45.6  36.4
Uzbekistan  8.4  12.7  58.1  52.9  41.3  36.5  39.3  50.5
Former  Soviet Union  20.1  22.2  68.2  69.0  62.0  56.8  63.3  58.0
Source.  Shares  based upon data in current dollars in Table 1.9
There is no consistent  detailed information  on the evolution  of the
commodity  composition  of this trade after independence. The information
available (presented  in Table 4) suggests  the following  general pattern: Energy
in the form of oil and gas exports was a large pait of Russia's exports;
Ukraine exports primarily semifinished  industrial  products (steel) and
processed agricultural  commodities;  Uzbekistan  and Kazakstan  exports are
dominated  by raw materials; Belarus and the smaller countries tend to export a
variety of manufactured  commodities.
Part of the patterns of trade that had developed  reflected  natural
resource endowment. But part of the trade, especially  in manufactures,  was
the result of decisions  to locate production on the basis of political  or other
considerations  unrelated  to economic  efficiency. Some other part of trade
involved simply  inefficient  production  that could not be expected  to meet
international  competition  once a market system was adopted.  Losing this trade
could be welfare enhancing  rather than welfare reducing.
Gravity models suggest  that in the long run, following  market reforms,
the share of total trade accounted  for by FSU interregional  trade would decline
to about 15-30% of the total, depending  on the country [Kaminski  et. al.
1995]. In practice, the share seems  to have fallen more or less about what
would have been predicted.  However, the shift has occurred very rapidly and
within the context of substantial  declines in total trade.  Not all of this decline
resulted in welfare reductions: Some resulted simply  in reduced waste and
better allocation  of resources.,de  4: Commodity Composition  of Interstate Trade of Selected  FSU Countries, 1993
vcent  of total exports/imports)
Russia  Ukraine  Belarus  Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan
al exports  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
and gas  37.4  0.5  8.7  19.9  42.5  78.5
il and other fuels  0.5  1.5  .,  21.1  7.7
v materials  15.2  35.6  25.6  42.4  41.0
riculture  and food  4.4  22.6  5.3  11.2
nufactured  goods and other  42.4  39.8  60.5  5.4  8.9  21.5
tal imports  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
and gas  2.5  58.1  59.6  31.4  32.4
al and other fuels  1.5  1.1  1.6  4.9  3.0
w  materials  31.6  15.7  24.9  28.5  0.0
nculture and food  12.6  3.5  9.0  7.8  14.6  CD
nufactured  goods  and other  51.7  21.6  5.0  27.4  50.0
irce: World Bank  staff  estimates.11
Interstate  trade, however, declined significantly  both in countries which
implemented  extensive market reforms such as the Baltics as well as in slow
reformers such as Ukraine; in countries  that consciously  reoriented  exports and
in countries  that did not.  Thus, it can be argued that the rapid decline in
interstate  trade had an impact on output because of the highly interLinked
production structure  of the former Soviet Union.  Failure to supply needed
inputs in interstate  trade led to the reduction  of output in downstream
industries. And this output decline led to further declines in trade due to the
reduction in the production of exportables.
The decline in trade was compounded  by a very adverse terms-of-trade
shock for the energy and raw material importing states [Tarr,  1994]. During
1992-1994  the major energy exporters, Russia and Turkmenistan,  raised
previously heavily subsidized  prices for interstate shipments  of oil and natural
gas to close to world levels.  Table 5 presents estimates  of the terms-of-trade
change on interstate  trade.  The first column shows  what was the hypothetical
change in the terms of trade that would have occurred if prices moved to
international  levels based on the 1990 trade pattern.  The second  column
provides estimates  of terms of trade changes  actually experienced  by 1994.
The worst losers were the Baltic states, Belarus  and Moldova, which
were estimated  to experience  a loss on their terms of trade of between 20 and
40%.  The table shows  that what actually happened  was pretty close to what
had been predicted; and that most of the terms-of-trade  changes  had been
completed  by end-1994. The table also shows  that the terms-of-trade  shock
experienced  by some of the energy importers was larger than the terms-of-Table 5: Terms-of-Trade in Interstate Trade, 1994
(1990=100)
Hypothetical  Actual
changes in moving  changes
to world prices
(1)  (2)
Armenia  68.3  75.6
Azerbaijan  73.9  88.8
Belarus  80.1  86.2
Estonia  68.2  83.2
Georgia  55.2  64.3
Kazakhstan  98.5  94.8
Kyrgyzstan  87.3  81.1
Latvia  75.7  80.0
Lithuania  65.2  77.8
Moldova  46.6  56.2
Russia  137.6  118.9
Tajikistan  75.3  77.1
Turkmenistan  134.7  139.5
Ukraine  86.2  93.0
Uzbekistan  91.0  90.9
Source: Column 1: Tarr,  1994.
Column 2: Dikhanov, 1995.13
trade shock that Kenen estimated  for Eastern Europe and substantially  larger
than that experienced  by oil-importing  countries after the oil shock of 1973.
2.  Payments  problems
Payments  problems, with economic  agents either unwilling or unable to
use the banking system to pay for goods and services  from other countries  may
well have been the most serious impediment  to interstate  trade.  Two distinct
subperiods  can be identified:  First, the two-year  period from independence  in
late-1991  to late-1993  through early-1994  by which time almost all FSU
countries  had established  their own currencies; second, the two-year period
from beginning-1994  to the present (beginning-1996).
The first two-year period was truly chaotic. There were three sets of
interrelated  problems: (a) Correspondent  accounts  between commercial  banks
in each of these countries  could not be used to handle interstate  trade
transactions,  because there were disincentives  or restrictions  in their use and
because of technical shortcomings  and delays in making cross border
payments; at the same time enterprises  did not wish to pay for imports  from
other FSU countries  with scarce hard currencies, and thus were unwilling to
use foreign correspondent  banks for interstate  trade; (b) the attempt to operate
a common  ruble zone failed (see below) and foreign exchange  markets in the
new currencies  issued  by new independent  states took some  time to be
established;  and (c) in the interim, the Central Bank clearing and payments
system,  established  by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to control unlimited14
financing of bilateral trade deficits imposed  further uncertainties  and
constraints on the trading system [Michalopoulos  and Tarr 1992a  and 1994a].
In market economies,  the existence  of an effective  banking system and
the operation of foreign exchange  markets gives enterprises access to the
currencies  through which they can make/receive  payments  to and from  -
enterprises in trading partner countries.  At the time of the break-up of the
Soviet Union and the establishment  of fifteen new independent  states such a
system for making decentralized  payments  across borders did not exist.  The
ruble was the common  currency  but losing value rapidly on account  of high
inflation, leading to the introduction  of many quasi currencies, e.g.,  in
Ukraine.  Payments  took a lot of time to complete, were not always final and
were made without  regard as to whether the payer had sufficient  funds.
In February 1992, in an effort to monitor and facilitate  interstate
payments, the CBR and the other central  banks established  a system of official
correspondent  accounts  through which payments  were to be channeled.
During this period Russia alone could create cash rubles, but the central banks
of the other independent  FSU states could expand  the aggregate  money supply
by creating credit in rubles.  This led to the emergence  of  different so-called
"non cash rubles" in different countries  with different  exchange  rates between
them and the Russian ruble.  In the absence  of monetary  coordination  among
the central banks,  governments  saw no value in exporting  in the ruble zone.
All they gained for the exports were ruble credits in their banking system,
something  their central banks could create independently  and they had too
much of in any case.  Governments,  including  the Baltics, quickly responded15
by imposing export licensing requirements on interstate trade which were
typically more severe than in their trade outside the FSU [Michalopoulos and
Tarr,  1994a].
The payments situation deteriorated further after July 1992.  Russia
began to accumulate large surpluses on its bilateral trade balances with most of
the new independent states.  To avoid unlimited financing of these trade
surpluses and stem the outflow of goods, Russia imposed credit limits on the
central bank correspondent accounts of these countries.  When correspondent
balances with the CBR were exhausted, they were either replenished by
borrowing in the form of so-called "technical credits" or the CBR suspended
payments by the central bank that had run out of ruble balances.  Also,
because the accounts at the CBR were bilateral,  it was not possible to offset
deficits with surpluses generated with other FSU countries.  The system was
still plagued by huge uncertainties and long delays (about three months) in a
highly inflationary environment.  Since the CBR could refuse to clear the pay-
ments orders of enterprises in a country that exceeded its limit, this meant that
Russian exporters would not be paid for the goods they shipped, even if the
importer had funds in its commercial bank to cover the payments order.
In early 1993, the Russian authorities decided to curb further financing
of the other FSU states through the CBR and informed them that after the
bilateral credits already negotiated were exhausted, they would have to obtain
loans through the budget.  This was followed in June  1993 by a resolution of
the Supreme Soviet formally discontinuing access to other FSU countries to
financing from the CBR and the demonetization of the pre-1993 ruble soon16
thereafter. The latter formally  put an end to the ruble zone and forced the
remaining  non-Russian  members (Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakstan,  Moldova, Turkmenistan,  Tajikistan  and Uzbekistan)  into a
dilemma: introduce their own currencies  or accept monetary  union with
Russia, with monetary  policy largely determined  by the CBR.
All these countries  but Tajikistan  had introduced  their own currencies
by early 1994; the latter did so in 1995. These countries  had stayed in the
ruble zone essentially  for two reasons: First, and perhaps most important,
there was the expectation  that membership  would provide them with easy
sources of financing. Second, for political reasons they did not want to
"offend" Russia on which they depended  in a variety of ways, not the least of
which was access to energy and raw material imports on, hopefully, subsidized
terms.  When it appeared that financing on easy terms would no longer be
available, that energy  imports would become more expensive  over time, that
monetary instability  in Russia continued  and that they would not face political
sanctions,  they opted out of the zone.  In so doing, they joined the Baltics, the
Kyrgyz Republic and Ukraine which had launched  their own currencies  in
1992 and 1993, respectively. 3
During this two-year period of unsettled  monetary  and exchange  policy,
the decentralization  of payments  through correspondent  banks was hindered  in
a variety of ways: Processing of payments  by the central banks was being done
at a more appreciated  exchange  rate between  the Russian ruble and the
"national  non-cash  rubles" than was usually available  to commercial  banks. In
addition, between August 1992 and July 1993, the CBR did not permit the17
opening of new accounts  for correspondent  banks in countries  that did not have
national currencies. Russian banks, facing both credit and exchange risk were
not interested  in holding balances  in other countries  using the ruble; on the
other hand, banks from other FSU countries  wanted to build precautionary
balances  in accounts  they had in Russia--a  practice which some states
prohibited in order to stem the outflow of capital  to Russia.
The disarray in payments  during this period had a devastating  impact
on interstate  trade.  Some large enterprises,  especially  in Russia, were able to
continue to do business in other FSU countries  partly using rubles and partly
hard currency.  In 1992 and 1993 financial  firms in several  CIS member
countries  were offering to intermediate  payments in other CIS members  for
fees ranging up to 20-30% of the value of the transactions [Gros,  1994a]. But
most enterprises either stopped  trading or resorted to barter.
In the beginning  of 1994, the start of the second  period, the
introduction  of new currencies  and the progressive elimination  of controls  on
correspondent  bank accounts,  improved the opportunities  for decentralized
financing  of trade.  Countries  no longer had to fear that direct trade between
enterprises  facilitated  through the commercial  banking system would result in
trade surpluses  that had no value.  A growing network  of correspondent
accounts  among commercial  banks spread through some  countries (Russia  and
Ukraine), providing potentially  fast turnaround  on payments.
While this network started  to facilitate  some trade, a host of new issues
emerged:  First, the new currencies, with few exceptions  (the Baltics, Kyrgyz18
Republic),  were not fully convertible.  The markets for these currencies were
not developed and could not be used in trade.  Trade between Russia and the
CIS countries was usually denominated in rubles; but this entailed considerable
foreign exchange risk because of the ruble's  instability.  Use of correspondent
accounts was further constrained by the general weaknesses of the commercial
banking system.  Many countries were also facing a serious foreign exchange
shortage and were unwilling to use foreign exchange for the denomination or
settlement of interstate trade transactions.
As of early  1996 the payments situation had improved; but the
improvements were uneven and much remained to be done in many countries.
The banking system and payments were functioning best in the Baltics and to a
lesser extent in Russia.  Correspondent banks were being used for the conduct
of trade in practically all countries without significant restrictions; but there
were considerable weaknesses:  clearances could take as long as fifteen days,
there was no trade finance and importers usually had to make payments in
advance in full; and letters of credit were not being used to finance interstate
trade transactions.  While foreign exchange markets were operating in
practically all countries, there were continued restrictions (for example
significant surrender requirements) in several countries,  notably Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.  As a result barter continued to be an important instrument of
trade among most of the new states.  While estimates of the total  share of
barter transactions are difficult to determine,  countries (with the exception of
the Baltics) report that in  1995 about a quarter to a third of total interstate
transactions occur through barter;  slightly less in trade with Russia and slightly
more in trade among the other countries.19
C.  FINANCING  CONSTRAINTS
The information on the amount of financing made available in support
of interstate trade is quite incomplete.  It is not possible to develop information
on what has happened in the provision of financing for interstate trade on an
annual basis and for all the countries.  The information that is available is the
amount of outstanding ex post credits that were provided primarily by Russia
to the other countries--except the Baltics.  In some of the cases (and especially
for the most important creditors and debtors) it is possible to confirm the
information by obtaining data both from the creditors and the debtors.  In
other cases no information is available.
Table 6 presents the information that we have been able to piece
together.  The first column shows the cumulative deficit/surplus countries have
had on interstate trade in the period  1992-1994.  The remaining data show the
total amount of outstanding credits that exist, mostly as of mid-1995, between
these countries. 4
Despite the incompleteness of the data, the table brings out the salient
characteristics of financing of interstate trade in the last four years.  First,  it
shows quite clearly that Russia and Turkmenistan are the main creditors,  while
Ukraine and Belarus are the main debtors in absolute terms.  Relative to the
size of their economy however,  Tajikistan and Georgia also have accumulated
a large amount of debt in interstate trade.Table  6: Interstate  Trade  Balances  and  Financing  in the CIS Members,  1992-1994
(million US dollars)
Cumulative  Cumulative Credits from Russia  Cumulative Credits
Cumulative  known  technical  state credits,  for
trade balance,  net financing,  credits,  1993-  natural gas  From  Fron  From
1992-1994  1992-1994  *  Total  1992-1993  mid-1995  deliveries  Turkmnenistan  Kazakhstan  Uzbeldstan
Armenia  -229  138  86  45  41  ..  51
Azerbaijan  42  148  82  82  ..  ..  66
Belarus  -1,350  925  925  385  81  459
Georgia  -342  662  150  135  12  3  489  22
Kazakhstan  -1,290  1,154  1,320  1,250  68  2
Kyrgyzstan  -280  434  390  113  21  256  28  16
Moldova  -283  122  122  89  33  ..
Russia  14,007  -8,977  ..
Tajikistan  -240  471  254  127  127  ..  18  199
Turkmenistan  2,000  -1,390  134  134  ..  23
Ukraine  -6,728  5,922  4,981  2,500  204  2,277  940  1
Uzbekistan  -16  390  533  418  115  ..  ..  96
Total  8,977  5,278  702  2,997  1,547  166  39
* Includes  some financing  for 1995.
Sources:
Data on trade balances  for 1992-1994  are from Table 1. Data on financing  are World Bank staff  estimates,  based on information  supplied  by member  countries21
As with other aspects  of the trade and payments situation  during this
period, financing was also quite chaotic. The bulk of financing,  approximately
80%, was forced, in the sense that it did not result from a contractual
arrangement  by individual  countries  to seek or provide credit.  Instead it was
either the result of arrears (usually  for natural gas shipments  by Turkmeinistan
and Russia) which were subsequently  consolidated  or it was the result of the
provision of overdraft facilities  or "technical"  credits by the CBR which were
subsequently  formalized  in the form of a credit usually denominated  in dollars
at a LIBOR linked interest rate and with a variety of maturities. Several  of the
consolidated  credits especially  between Turkmenistan  and Ukraine and some  of
the other small gas importers  also involve repayments  in kind or in the form of
equity  participations  in the debtor's enterprises. Some of the credits
outstanding  (e.g., from Russia  to Tajikistan)  are not, strictly speaking,
financing for trade but have been incurred for the provision  of currency  by
Russia.
The interest rates and amortization  periods on which the forced
financing has been consolidated  are close to commercial. They have generally
been extended without an assessment  of the countries' creditworthiness. A
number of countries in the region (the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan)  have
found it difficult to meet these obligations  and have sought rescheduling.
Beyond  this forced financing  which occurred largely in 1992-1993  and
in the case of Turkmenistan  also in 1994, few new credits are known to have
been extended  during this period, perhaps no more than $700 million.  These
were provided by Russia, e.g.,  to Belarus, Kazakstan  and the Kyrgyz22
Republic.  In addition to these credits, there has been some $250 million of net
financing by Russian enterprises directly to enterprises in the rest of the FSU
in the form of excess of receivables over payables.  A few of the main credit
and financing arrangements related to interstate trade and payments of the past
few years are worth noting:
By far the largest amounts involve Russia providing financing to
Ukraine.  The total of almost $5 billion is almost 50% of the total
financing obtained by the 10 net debtor countries.  There are two major
components to this debt, that related to CBR overdrafts and technical
credits and that related to debt linked to shipments of natural gas by the
Russian monopoly Gazprom (which is now a private company).
Separate agreements have been signed for servicing each component of
this debt.
Turkmenistan's  forced financing of natural gas exports accounts for the
bulk of the remaining known financing.  Turkmenistan has reached
agreements for the servicing of this debt (involving essentially
consolidating of arrears) with most of its debtors,  the most important of
which are Ukraine and Georgia.
Ukraine and to a much less extent Belarus and Kazakstan obtained the
bulk of the financing and are the largest debtors.  Ukraine is likely to
have provided some credits to a number of the smaller FSU countries
on which however, there is no information.
In addition to Ukraine and Belarus, Tajikistan and Georgia are major
debtors that are likely to require extensive rescheduling of their debt on
concessional terms--which has not formally happened yet.23
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan appear to have been in a net debtor position
with Russia but net creditors with other Central Asian economies.
This information with regard to the financing made available on
interstate trade can be compared to the total amount of financing provided to
these countries in the  1992-1994 period (Table 7).  The table shows that the
official development finance (which includes official grants as well loans on
both concessional and commercial terms) made available to these countries
from the rest of the world were substantially more in the aggregate than the
amount of new financing extended inside the FSU,  primarily by Russia and
Turkmenistan.  Upon closer examination however, it is important to note that
the bulk of the assistance recorded here involves grants given to Russia by
Germany to deal with the costs of relocation of Russian troops.  If one
excludes this financing,  the remaining amounts provided to the whole FSU
actually fall far short of the amounts of internal financing provided by Russia
and Turkmenistan.  Moreover,  most of the new external credits from the rest
of the world went to Russia.  In addition of course, Russia received very
substantial financing in the form of deferral of its own debt payments,  while it
extended an unknown amount of defacto deferials  on interest and principal to
developing countries which have not been servicing fully their obligations to
the FSU.5 All of this financing also is substantially less than the capital flight
that has occurred from  most FSU countries in this period and which has
variously been estimated at $20-40 billion.Table 7: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to the CIS Members, 1992-94
(million US dollars)
Ukraine,
Belarus, and  Central
Total CIS  Russia  Moldova  Transcaucasus  Asia
Official development finance  16,871.0  12,146.3  2,360.4  590.9  1,773.4
Official development assistance  11,252.0  9,214.8  1,468.9  192.8  375.5
Official grants  10,125.8  8,700.0  1,187.1  154.9  83.8
Official concessionary loans (net)  1,126.2  514.8  281.8  37.9  291.7
Bilateral  944.4  454.0  252.1  5.1  233.2
Multilateral  181.8  60.8  29.7  32.8  58.5
Official non-concessionary loans (net)  5,619.0  2,931.5  891.5  398.1  1,397.9
Bilateral  3,389.3  1,810.9  368.9  179.8  1,029.7
Multilateral  2,229.7  1,120.6  522.6  218.3  368.2
Private flows  18,609.6  14,186.3  2,647.4  34.3  1,741.6
Private loans (net)  13,387.3  11,584.0  1,207.4  34.3  561.6
Foreign direct investment  5,020.0  2,400.0  1,440.0  0.0  1,180.0
Portfolio equity investment  202.3  202.3  0.0  0.0  0.0
Memorandum item:
Net use of IMF credit  5,096.3  4,062.7  613.7  63.9  356.0
Interstate known financing  10,547.0  ..  6,969.8  947.4  2,629.9
Sources:
World Bank debtor reporting system and Table 625
D.  ALTERNATIVE  SOLUTIONS
Following  independence  many believed it worthwhile  to try to preserve,
as much as possible of the previously integrated  monetary and trade system of
the Soviet Union.  Divergent  political and economic  interests however, made
this impossible. From the very beginning  the Baltic countries  made it very
clear that they wished to introduce  market-based  reforms quickly and to
reorient their economies  away from the FSU.  Ukraine, primarily  for political
reasons, also declared early on its intention  to issue its own currency  and
pursue an independent  monetary and economic  policy.  Attitudes  in the other
CIS countries ranged from the desire to collaborate  closely with Russia
(Belarus)  to the more independent--yet  cautious--policies  of some of the
countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
The lack of monetary  co-operation  throughout 1992 and the likely
unraveling  of the ruble zone, with the resulting adverse  effects on trade, led
many analysts to recommend  the establishment  of a clearing  and/or payments
union [Dornbush  1992, van Brabant 1991]. The same arguments that were
used in the context of Eastern Europe a few years earlier and the parallel with
the European  Payments  Union were again presented  in support of the
establishment  of a clearing and/or payments  union for the CIS members  (i.e.,
excluding  the Baltics, especially  Estonia and Latvia which moved  quickly in
the course of 1992 to establish  convertible  currencies).
Indeed throughout  this period the CIS countries  agreed to implement  a
number of co-operative  arrangements  in the field of trade and payments,26
ranging from complete monetary union to a multilateral clearing arrangement
to a customs union [Gros,1994a].  At present a customs union among Russia,
Belarus and Kazakstan is in the process of implementation.  No region-wide
arrangements have been put in place so far.  In the payments field the closest
anything came to be implemented was the establishment of a multilateral
clearing arrangement under the Interstate Bank.  Ten countries actually ratified
the treaty for the establishment of this Bank in 1993.  But in the end,  the Bank
(and multilateral clearing) did not get established, for reasons discussed below.
The question nonetheless remains as to whether a clearing and/or
payments union would have been useful in addressing the payments and
financing problems that impeded interstate trade at the time or, for that matter,
whether such arrangements would be useful at present.
1.  Convertibility and trade
Enterprise-to-enterprise trade and payments are facilitated in a single
currency area,  and there is a large literature discussing the requirements and
conditions for establishing optimum currency areas [Goldberg,  1995].  This
literature  stresses the benefits resulting from reduced transactions costs of trade
within an optimum currency area compared with the potential costs in terms of
macroeconomic adjustment that could result from the lack of exchange rate
policy within the area. Whatever this balance may be,  an essential precondition
for any currency area is control over aggregate money creation within the
area.27
In the context of the break-up of the former Soviet Union the strong
forces of devolution of political and economic power to the individual states
and the lack of co-ordination and free-rider problems that led to the break-up
of the ruble zone in 1993 suggest that it was not practical then and is not
practical now to aim for a re-establishment of an area-wide single currency
arrangement.  This does not mean however, that there may not be isolated
cases where countries might find it advantageous to seek to establish very
close monetary co-ordination or even a monetary union.  Indeed, there have
been numerous discussions aiming at the establishment of a monetary union
between Belarus and Russia, but  so far no agreement has been reached on the
variety of issues that would have to be addressed in this context.
If there are different currencies,  convertibility of these currencies,
especially for current account transactions, is the policy that would best
facilitate trade.  The examples of Estonia and Latvia and more recently the
Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania and Russia suggest that currency convertibility is
feasible both for small countries and large, for countries with significant
foreign exchange reserves and without; and that it can be achieved through the
use of a fixed exchange rate system, a freely floating one or even a managed
float,  such as the one used by Russia at present.
Even when currencies are not convertible, trade need not be impeded if
commercial banks establish correspondent accounts in hard currency in banks
in developed market economies and trade is denominated and settled in hard
currency.  Such arrangements indeed were made by commercial banks in all
FSU countries early on, and in some cases even before independence.  These28
arrangements  however, have not been fully utilized to support interstate  trade.
The most serious  impediment  to hard currency-based  transactions  has been the
limitations  on access to hard currency.  Auctions  or markets for hard
currencies  have existed in many countries, but the supply  of hard currency in
the past--and  in some still at present--was  limited because  of taxes, exchange
surrender requirements, and the general incentive  of enterprises that earn
foreign exchange  to hold on to it as a store of value and hedge against  inflation
or use it in transactions  with the hard currency areas.  Moreover,
governments  have imposed  constraints  on access to these markets that limit the
convertibility  of domestic  currencies  into dollars for the purpose of conducting
trade.  While the situation  is improving in this respect, such restraints continue
to exist, e.g.,  in Georgia, Turkmenistan  and Uzbekistan.
Moreover, the conduct of trade in hard currencies  through a network  of
correspondent  accounts  is not costless: First, banks will need to accumulate
hard currency  balances  to satisfy the transactions  demand for hard currency
trade.  There is an interest cost for maintaining  these deposits  that is equal to
the difference  between the interest earned on the accounts  and the opportunity
cost of these funds.  For countries  or banks whose cost of borrowing dollars
on international  markets is quite high, these costs may be substantial.
Second, fees must be paid to commercial  banks in developed  market
economies  for processing  the transactions.29
2.  Clearing arrangements  and the Interstate  Bank
Despite the examples  of Estonia and Latvia, there was considerable
doubt throughout 1992-1993  whether convertibility  was achievable  for most of
the countries in the former ruble zone.  It was also felt that hard currency
shortages, and weaknesses  in the commercial  banking system made it desirable
to consider the establishment  of a Central bank-based  multilateral  clearing
arrangement, especially  since the alternatives  appeared  to be either bilateral
clearing or barter.
The main objective of multilateral  clearing through Central Banks
would be to facilitate  trade by providing efficient and secure settlement  of
payments  for enterprise-to-enterprise  transactions  on a multilateral  basis; a
secondary  objective  could be savings  in the use of scarce  hard currency
resources and overcoming  the problems  that scarcity  of foreign exchange  and
ineffective  or constrained  foreign exchange markets  pose for international
trade.
In the context of the turbulent situationfprevailing  in 1992-1993  and
perhaps through 1994 such an arrangement  made a lot of sense: Unlike the
situation  in Eastern Europe, trade among the states involved  was a very
substantial  portion of total trade, currencies  were inconvertible,  clearing was
inefficient  and bilateral and there was general hard currency scarcity. A
multilateral  clearing arrangement  through the Central Banks would also have
permitted the clearing of a much larger volume of transactions  than was
feasible  through the correspondent  bank accounts. It has been estimated  that30
the reductions  on trade that would have been needed solely to achieve  bilateral
trade balance--and  by inference  the gains from multilateral  clearing--amounted
to 5-6% of incomes  for CIS countries  other than Russia.  This would have
been a benefit several times larger than the benefits from multilateral  clearing
that accrued  to the countries  of the European communities in 1958 [Gros,
1994b].
Such a multilateral  clearing arrangement  came very close to becoming
operative  in late-1993. An agreement  to establish  an Interstate  Bank for
mutilateral  clearing and settlements  among  ten CIS countries was actually
reached  in January 1993; and it was actually ratified by the parliaments  of
most countries  (with the notable exception  of Ukraine).
The agreement was intended  to be implemented  by the CBR using a
multilateral  payments mechanism  on the basis of the Russian ruble for
clearance  of trade transactions  among the member states' central banks.  The
CBR would inform the Interstate  Bank each day of the amount of imports from
the other states that they wanted  to pay for.  The Interstate  Bank would
provide a multilateral  clearing service and inform member states of their
cumulative  debtor or creditor  position.  A two-week settlement  period was
established  with full settlement  of all outstanding  balances  to be made in rubles
or hard currency.
The system was to run on an initial credit line from the Central Bank of
Russia (ftxed at 300 billion rubles), but there was to be no additional  credit,
except interim  finance amounting  to one-month's exports.  Central banks31
running up against their debt limit were expected to hold the amounts of
imports they wanted to pay through the system to the exports declared by the
other partner countries (or face expulsion).  Thus the Interstate Bank was
explicitly designed not to address the financing problems of major FSU debtor
countries.  It was explicitly foreseen that the Interstate Bank would operate  in
parallel to the commercial banking system and would never be made obligatory
(See Gros,  1994 for details).
Following the January  1993 agreement, little happened to implement it
as the Bank's  future became tangled up in the uncertainty over the evolution of
the ruble zone.  After that issue was resolved in the summer of  1993, an effort
to put the Bank in place was re-initiated in December  1993 with a meeting of
the Central Bank presidents.  At the time, it was anticipated that the Bank
would operate as a clearing mechanism for the emerging new--but not yet fully
convertible currencies.  Following that meeting however, no additional steps
were taken and the Interstate Bank never became operational.
The demise of the Bank occurred essentially for political economy
reasons: Russia did not want the institution because it had a convertible
currency and was in a trade surplus position with practically all other CIS
countries.  It felt that it had no trouble in conducting trade in rubles and was
afraid that the clearing arrangement would be used to perpetuate its financing
of the deficits of the other member countries of the Bank; i.e.,  that the Bank
would become a payments union with Russia the main creditor.  The others
had a free rider problem:  No individual country had a large enough incentive
to invest the political capital needed to push for the Interstate Bank,  since the32
institution  would work only if everybody  participated  and the benefits would
accrue to all.
While a clearing arrangement  such as that under the proposed  Interstate
Bank may have been desirable at that time, the question is whether it would be
useful to deal with the continuing  problems faced by countries  in interstate
trade at present (1996).  The main difference  in the last two years is that more
countries have made progress towards establishing  currency convertibility  and
the commercial  banking  system, while not fuHly  effective, has also been
strengthened. Trying to establish  an new multilateral  arrangement  carries
risks:  One risk is that it could distract from efforts to promote convertibility,
as well as efforts to strengthen  clearing and settlements  through correspondent
bank arrangements.  Moreover, the political  economy  reasons that prevented
the establishment  of the Interstate  Bank are just as much present today as they
were two years earlier.  Thus, the time for a clearing arrangement  has passed.
The best course is to push ahead with convertibility  and take all possible steps
to facilitate  the use of correspondent  commercial  banks to facilitate  payments.
There is a lot that needs to be done in that regard: Commercial  banks
in countries  introducing  new currencies  have opened correspondent  ruble
accounts in Russia, and Russian commercial  banks maintain  correspondent
ruble accounts  in those countries. These types of arrangements  have been
used to conduct some of the trade between Russia and the other FSU countries
for some time now; they are less used in trade among the other countries. In
the context of such trade Russian firms have been insisting  on receiving33
payments in rubles or hard currencies. Denominating  trade in rubles poses a
number of difficulties  for some of the other countries
The most important  problem is the continuing  high rate of inflation in
Russia, which discourages  exporters  from accepting  payment in rubles. 6 An
additional  risk involves  ruble-denominated  payments  for contracts  in the
future.  The absence of effective  futures markets in most of the CIS makes it
difficult for traders to hedge against an adverse movement  in the exchange rate
on futures contracts even in dollar-denominated  contracts. The recent
establishment  of a band for the ruble has obviously  helped the situation, but
the absence of a well functioning  futures market is still a problem that needs to
be addressed.
Another  problem that has plagued interstate  trade is the absence of
mechanisms  to deal with risks of nonpayment  by buyers and nonperformance
by sellers.  Such risks are typically  handled through insurance  services, trade
contract enforcement, and appropriate methods  of payments (notably  letters of
credit), mechanisms  that are not available  in Russia  and most of the other
states of the former Soviet Union.  Letters of credit guaranteed  by Western
banks for dollar-denominated  transactions  are available, however, and this
mechanism  is already used to guarantee  payment for imports from Western
countries.  On the other hand, traders that use the ruble as the basis of
interstate  payments  through commercial  bank correspondent  accounts  in the
former Soviet Union take risks that can be avoided if the dollar and Western
banks are employed. Development  of similar mechanisms  to deal with ruble
denominated  trade through the commercial  banks is another area which needs34
to be addressed. More broadly, institutions  need to be developed  to facilitate
direct trade among individual  agents without government  foreign exchange
rationing.
Barter, which is intrinsically  less efficient, will be abandoned  in
interstate  trade only if a well-functioning  payments system is established.
Although state trading barter arrangements  should be discouraged,  privately
arranged  barter or payments  arrangements  during the interim should not be
discouraged. Provided the barter deal is arranged  by individual  agents acting
on the basis of market signals,  private barter trade reflects the fact that the
individual  agents find barter more efficient than the banking system; moreover,
private barter should respond to the principles of comparative  advantage.
Thus, regulations  prohibiting  private barter do not attack the cause of the
problem, which is macroeconomic  instability  and payments  difficulties.
3.  Payments  unions and financing
All of the measures  discussed  above could help facilitate  trade and
payments. But they would not deal with the fundamental  financing  problems
that have emerged  in interstate  trade.  The establishment  of a payments  union
had been proposed  early on--especially  as the demise of the ruble zone
appeared inevitable--in  order to address  the emerging financing  problems  that
were perceived  to hamper interstate  trade.
The main difference  between a strictly multilateral  clearing  arrangement
such as the Interstate  Bank and a payments  union is the provision of more35
extensive financing for deficits arising in interstate trade, based on some
prearranged  rules.  Proponents of the establishment of a payments union in the
FSU-just  as they did in the case of Eastern Europe a few years earlier--have
based their arguments on the successful contribution of the European Payments
Union in revitalizing intra-European trade in the 1950s [van Brabant,1991].
In a payments union, only part of the multilateral balance needs to be
paid until a country exhausts its credit limit.  A payments union in the FSU
was recommended in the hope that it would accomplish one or more of the
following objectives: provide an incentive for regional trade,  establish a
payments facility among countries with inconvertible currencies,  or provide
financing and balance of payments support [Williamson,  19921.  The
establishment of a payments union has actually been agreed in principle by CIS
members in late-1994; and all twelve CIS members agreed to establish an
Interstate Currency Committee in May 1995 as a first step in implementing a
payments union--although not much has happened since then.
The basic problem with a payments union is that superior policy
instruments are available to meet each of these objectives:  And it is well
established in economic theory that it is preferable to use the instrument that
most directly attacks the problem at hand. 7 If the problem impeding trade is
making payments in the context of inconvertible currencies, a multilateral
clearing arrangement would suffice; the additional financing provided by the
payments union would not be necessary to deal with the problem.36
Assuming  that clearing arrangements  are in place, trade incentives  can
be provided less costly and more effectively  to intra-regional  trade by
preferential  treatment through tariffs and related trade measures  than through
the provision of aggregate  balance of payments  financing to countries  with an
overall debtor position on intra-regional  trade.  This is because  the relative
"softness"  of payments  to countries within the union (i.e., the availability  of
financing)  is perceived  by the central bank of government  authorities  but is not
internalized  in the decision making of importing enterprises  unless the central
bank imposes  foreign exchange rationing  or other trade diverting controls on
payments outside  the union.  But in these circumstances,  preferential trade
arrangements  are the most direct and transparent  means of stimulating  trade
with partner countries. This is not the place to discuss in detail the advantages
and disadvantages  of trade preferences  for FSU countries.  Suffice  it to say
that such arrangements  may be beneficial  or harmful to some or all of the
countries  in the region, depending  on their design; and a number of
preferential  arrangements  are already in place--which  however, do not meet
the standard conditions  for efficient customs unions  or free trade areas.  The
only point that needs to be emphasized  here is that a payments  union is not the
preferred approach to provide preferential  trade treatment [Michalopoulos  and
Tarr, 1994b]
This leaves the question of whether establishing  a payments  union
which would provide a certain amount of financing  for intra-union  payments
imbalances  would have been at some time or is at present a useful policy
approach  to dealing with the financing  problems facing some countries  on
interstate  trade.  In addressing  this question the first issue that needs to be37
considered  is the expected creditor/debtor  position of the various countries  that
might participate in a potential arrangement. For the purposes of this
discussion  we need to look solely at the CIS countries, i.e.,  excluding  the
Baltics. They have neither the political interest nor the economic  need to
involve themselves  in a payments arrangement  with the former Soviet Union
countries.
Based on the trade patterns of the last several years (see Table 6) it
would  appear that Russia and Turkmenistan  would  emerge as major creditors,
Uzbekistan  a creditor--but  not for significant  amounts--and  Ukraine and
Belarus as the major debtors in-absolute  terms, but with a number of the other
smaller CIS countries, e.g.,  Georgia, Tajikistan  showing relatively smaller
deficits in absolute  terms but large relative to their total trade.  The remaining
countries  would also likely be in deficit for interstate  trade but not in large
absolute or relative terms.
The question would then arise as to whether  Russia and Turkmenistan,
the likely persistent  creditors in a payments  union with the rest of the FSU,
would be willing  to provide the necessary  credit.  Notwithstanding  the 1994
agreement  to establish  a CIS wide payments  union, there is little evidence  that
they would: Russia has had persistent  balance of payments difficulties  and has
been unable to service its external debt without  extensive  debt rescheduling.
Its attitude during the discussions  of the Interstate  Bank clearly showed  that it
had no interest in providing significant  financing for interstate  trade, especially
if it were to be of the automatic  unconditional  variety likely to be needed for a
payments union.  Turkmenistan  is a poor country with very large energy38
potential which is keen on utilizing its foreign exchange earning capacity to
modernize  and develop its economy; again it is highly unlikely  that it would
voluntarily  enter an understanding  in which it would  provide external financing
for an indefinite  period to other FSU countries. Both Russia and
Turkmenistan  are indeed trying to reduce  the arrears owed to them by other
FSU countries.
In light of the difficulties  Russia and Turkmenistan  may face in
providing credit in general or within a payments  union, should donor nations
or multilateral  institutions  step in to provide the credit?  And if so, should  they
do so in the context of a payments union or bilaterally  and in the context of
agreed programs of reform supported  by the IMF and the World Bank?
The problem of providing external financial  support through a payments
union is that the rules of payments  unions typically  allow access to credit
unconditionally  and on the basis of predetermined  credit limits.  Under these
circumstances  countries that are pursuing the worst macroeconomic  policies
may run the largest deficits and draw most heavily on the credit.  Should  a
payments  union have been concluded,  let us say in 1992-1993,  among the CIS
countries, the bulk of the benefits would have accrued  to Ukraine and Belarus,
arguably two of the countries  that have been among the slowest  to reform
[DeMelo  et.al. 1995]. Perversely, balance of payments  support would have
gone to the countries  whose adjustment  programs are least worthy of support.
In this way, a payments  union may prolong inappropriate  macroeconomic
policies; in particular, it may prolong the period during which the country
operates without  a convertible  currency. While it is conceivable  that39
conditionality  regarding  macro-economic  adjustment  could have been
introduced  through a hypothetical  payments union, it is highly unlikely  that
such conditionality  would have been more effective  in stimulating  the
introduction  of macro-economic  adjustment  than the direct involvement  of the
IMF with each of the countries.
Moreover, some of the potential  participants,  e.g.,  Uzbekistan,  had a
greater need for balance  of payments support  to finance imports  from outside
the payments  union, but the credit provided-to  the payments  union is restricted
to balance of payments support within the region. While a payments  union was
not and is not the answer to the financing  problems  of some of the countries  of
the region, the financing needs of these countries  are quite real and need to be
addressed. Outside  Russia very little external financing has been directed to
these countries  in the aggregate. At the same time, the reform process in
some of them (Ukraine, Uzbekistan)  only started in earnest in 1994; others
continued  to be plagued by war and insurrection  through most of the period
(Tajikistan,  Georgia, Azerbaijan,  Armenia).  Thus it is hard to make
judgements as to whether additional  financing should have been made available
during this period--or if it had been made available  that it would  have been
utilized effectively.
As of the beginning  of 1996, however, IMF-supported  stabilization
programs had been put in place in practically  all the countries. Similarly  the
World Bank and many bilateral donors were providing a variety of assistance
programs in support of reforms in all countries. The key issues arising
regarding  financing were as follows:40
Many countries  were not in position to receive  export credit financing
because of the absence of "cover" from main OECD export credit
agencies.
Some bilateral financing, e.g., balance of payments funding  from the
European Union, which was urgently needed in deficit countries (e.g.,
Ukraine), was conditioned  on non-economic  issues (e.g., action on
shutting down nuclear reactors)  which was difficult to implement  in the
short run.
*  There was urgent need for the provision of debt relief for two of the
poorer of the FSU countries  which have a large amount of intra-FSU
debt:  Georgia and Tajikistan. Given the financing  problems  faced by
these two countries, long term and concessionary  debt relief is needed.
Yet the creditors themselves  (e.g., Kazakstan,  Uzbekistan)  have
financing  problems. Their ability to provide concessional  financing
depends  to some extent on the amount of financing  they are able to
obtain from sources outside  the FSU.
*  Russia and Turkmenistan  are likely to continue  to be major creditors
within the FSU while net debtors with the rest of the world.  Both
countries need to develop a suitable  financing strategy as well as
transparent  credit facilities  for the financing  that they are likely to
continue  to extend  to FSU countries. The latter needs to take into
account  the creditworthiness  of the recipient so as to ensure that
repayment  will be made and there will not be a need to reschedule  soon
after the credits are extended.41
All countries need to take steps to increase  their capacity  to absorb
foreign assistance  more effectively. At present, the World Bank, by far
the region's largest provider of public financing has a portfolio  of
committed  but undisbursed  assistance  amounting  to more than $6 billion
of which $4 billion alone is in Russia.
E.  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENtDATIONS
Payments  problems  constrained  interstate  trade among the CIS countries
over the period 1992-1995,  and especially  during the long drawn out demise of
the ruble zone.  The solution to these problems should be sought in two
general directions: More effective  stabilization  measures  that would enhance
the prospects of convertibility  for the countries in the region; and
strengthening  of the institutional  arrangements  that would permit payments  and
settlements  through correspondent  bank accounts. The latter involves
strengthening  of the commercial  banks themselves, liberalizing  foreign
exchange markets and promoting the use of letters of credit and other
mechanisms  that increase  the security of trade transactions.
While a multilateral  clearing arrangement  operated among Central
Banks would have been a useful alternative  to the chaotic  payments  conditions
prevailing in the earlier part of the period, such arrangements  are no longer
needed  because there has been considerable  progress towards convertibility. A
payments union was not desirable  earlier or at present to deal with continuing42
financing  problems  prevailing in some  of the countries especially  energy
importers.
Financing  problems  faced by some of the countries could be eased by
their pursuit of more effective adjustment  policies. For example domestic
energy prices in some energy importers such as Ukraine continue  to be below
world prices.  This would imply that balance of payments  requirements  could
be eased through measures  that will reduce the demand  for energy imports.
Notwithstanding  such measures, countries  like Ukraine and Belams are likely
to continue to run significant  deficits on interstate  trade.  Surplus countries,
such as Russia and Turkmenistan  need to develop transparent  means for trade
fmancing which take into account  the capacity  of the recipient to repay.
External financing  will continue  to be an important source of financing
for practically  all countries in the region.  The most effective  means of
mobilizing  private financing  is the establishment  of macro-economic  stability
and transparent  and stable rules regarding inflow of private capital.  For public
resource flows the key challenges  revolve around improving  the absorptive
capacity of countries to absorb quickly large amounts of already committed
finance. This would  require action both by donors  to expedite  procurement  and
other administrative  procedures  and on the parts of recipients  to address the
problems of governance  and institutional  weaknesses  that delay the
disbursement  of committed  funding.43
Certain of the smaller CIS countries  face significant  debt servicing
difficulties; their creditors are frequently  other CIS countries, which
themselves  require additional  financing. Debt relief to these countries is
needed  on concessional  terms.  Provision  of such relief however, needs to be
supported  by further external assistance  to enable the creditors  in the region to
provide relief on such terms.44
ENDNOTES
1.  I had reached similar conclusions  in my paper with David Tarr [Michalopoulos  and Tarr
1992a].
2.  It was a high proportion of GDP, but the estimates  are somewhat  distorted  by the artificial
exchange  rate used to value international  trade
3.  The IMF early on had supported  the notion of a ruble-based  monetary  union.  It abandoned
the idea as soon as it became apparent in early 1992  that monetary co-ordination  among the
Central Banks was impossible. Thereafter,  both the IMF and the World Bank, the sources of
most of the external financial  support to these countries over this period, were keen to
promote stabilization  policies in these countries and felt that such policies had a better chance
of succeeding  if they were in a position to pursue an independent  monetary  policy.
4.  In interpreting  the table please note that trade and current account imbalances  in intra-FSU
transactions  can be quite different than intra-FSU  financing, as imbalances  in these
transactions  may be financed  by extra-FSU  credits.
5.  Russia took over under the "zero" option all of the old obligations  and assets of the FSU.
Unlike the predictions  made early on, Russia also now has a debt amounting  to about $25
billion to former CMEA  countries. This was the result of the fact that despite a substantial
terms of trade of improvement  with the rest of the CMEA countries--as  Kenen had predicted--
the volume of Russia's exports in 1991-1992  declined  substantially  whereas shipment  of the
former CMEA countries  did not.45
6.  The monthly rate of inflation  of the Russian  ruble was 18% as of January 1995 (almost  800%
annually), but declined  to about 4% by the end of the year.
7.  This has been developed  by a number of authors, most notably  Jagdish Bhagwati,  Harry
Johnson, V. Ramaswami,  and T. N. Srinivasan.  See, for example,  Jagdish Bhagwati  (1971).46
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